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The Equity-Financing Channel, the Catering Channel, 
and Corporate Investment: International Evidence 
 
Abstract 
We examine how stock market mispricing affects corporate investment in an international setting. 
We find that investment is more sensitive to stock prices for equity-dependent firms than for non-
equity-dependent firms in our international sample. Investment is also more sensitive to stock 
prices for firms located in countries with more developed capital markets (i.e., lower costs of 
raising capital), higher share turnover (i.e., shorter shareholder horizons), and higher R&D 
intensity (i.e., more opaque assets). More importantly, the positive relation between equity 
dependence and the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is more pronounced for firms located 
in these same countries. These findings are consistent with the equity-financing hypothesis and the 
catering hypothesis on corporate investment proposed by Baker et al. (2003) and Polk and 
Sapienza (2009), respectively.  
 
JEL classifications: G32; G34 
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1. Introduction 
The existing literature has documented ample evidence of a positive relation between 
corporate investment and stock prices. The traditional explanation for this observed positive 
association is the “q-theory of investment” (Tobin, 1969)). In an efficient market, stock prices 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) reflect the market’s information about a firm’s investment opportunities 
or its marginal rate of return on capital. However, studies in behavioral finance have offered 
alternative explanations. For example, Keynes (1936) points out that stock market mispricing has 
an effect on the cost of equity, while Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and others argue that mispricing 
can also affect the cost of debt through its effect on perceived collateral values. Since the non-
fundamental component of stock prices causes the effective cost of external equity to deviate from 
the cost of other forms of capital, this divergence affects a firm’s equity financing and, 
consequently, corporate investment.  
Based on Stein (1996), Baker et al. (2003) derive and test a simple model that suggests that 
corporate investment is more sensitive to stock prices for equity-dependent firms than for non-
equity-dependent firms. The intuition is that managers of equity-dependent firms have incentives 
to issue equity in more attractive terms to finance investment when their stock prices are 
overvalued; but they would rather forgo their investment opportunities when their stock prices are 
undervalued. Using a modified KZ index first constructed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) as a 
measure of equity dependence, Baker et al. (2003) find support for the equity-financing channel 
argument for U.S. firms.  
Also based on Stein (1996), Polk and Sapienza (2009) develop and test a catering theory of 
investment, through which stock market mispricing affects corporate investment decisions. Using 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for mispricing, their empirical results from U.S. firms are 
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consistent with the predictions of the catering theory--overvalued firms invest more while 
undervalued firms invest less. In addition, this catering effect is more pronounced for firms with 
shorter shareholder horizons (proxied by higher share turnover) and longer expected durations of 
mispricing (proxied by higher R&D intensity). 
Despite these findings, very little is known about the relation between the roles of the equity-
financing channel and the catering channel in corporate investment outside the United States, and 
in particular in emerging markets. Our first objective is therefore to examine whether the results 
documented by Baker et al. (2003) on the role of the equity-financing channel in corporate 
investment can be extended to our international sample. The equity-financing hypothesis predicts 
that the degree of equity dependence is positively related to the effect of stock prices on corporate 
investment. In this study, we focus on the effect of the equity-financing channel on corporate 
investment at the firm level. 
Our second objective is to test whether the catering theory of Polk and Sapienza (2009) can 
also be extended to the international markets. More specifically, we extend the theory to allow for 
the cross-country difference in the cost of raising external equity capital. This extended catering 
theory suggests that corporate investment is more sensitive to stock prices for firms located in 
countries with a lower cost of raising external equity capital. The original catering theory of Polk 
and Sapienza (2009) also predicts that corporate investment is more sensitive to stock prices for 
firms whose shareholders have shorter horizons and whose assets are more difficult to value. In 
this study, we focus on the effects of the catering channel on corporate investment at the country 
level. 
Our third and final objective considers the joint effects of the equity-financing and catering 
channels on the relation between corporate investment and stock prices. Specifically, we expect 
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the positive relation between firm-level equity dependence and the sensitivity of investment to 
stock prices to be stronger for firms located in countries with lower financing costs and more short-
term investors, as well as for firms whose assets are more difficult to evaluate. 
To test our hypotheses, we use the financial flexibility index as an inverse measure of firm-
level equity dependence. Our first main result confirms the role of the equity-financing channel in 
corporate investment decisions in the broader cross-country sample. More specifically, the 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices monotonically increases with the degree of equity 
dependence. We recognize that there may be alternative explanations for our result and potential 
measurement problems concerning several of our explanatory variables in the regressions. We 
attempt to address these concerns by performing a series of robustness tests. Our result survives 
these robustness tests.  
To test the catering theory, we use the extent of capital market development to measure the 
cost of raising external capital. Capital market development is measured at the country level by: 
the ease of access to equity markets and whether the market is developed or emerging. In addition, 
we use country-level share turnover and R&D intensity to measure average shareholder horizon 
and the opaqueness of average firm assets, respectively. Consistent with the predictions of the 
extended catering theory, we find that corporate investment is more sensitive to stock prices for 
firms located in countries with more developed capital markets, higher share turnover, and higher 
R&D intensity. More importantly, the role of the equity-financing channel in the sensitivity of 
investment to stock prices is more pronounced for firms located in these same countries. These 
results suggest that both the equity-financing and catering channels affect the effect of stock market 
mispricing on corporate investment decisions.  
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The studies that are closest to ours are the ones by Baker et al. (2003) and Polk and Sapienza 
(2009). Baker et al. (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009) emphasize solely the roles of equity 
dependence and the catering channel, respectively, at the firm level. By contrast, our international 
sample allows us to focus on the roles of firm-level equity dependence and country-level 
institutions or characteristics as well as their joint effects. To the best of our knowledge, no 
previous empirical study has attempted to examine these issues jointly. 
The findings from our study also complement the literature on the effect of stock prices on 
corporate investment. Earlier studies by Morck et al. (1990) and Blanchard et al. (1993) find little 
evidence that the stock market affects corporate investment. However, the evidence from recent 
studies by Baker et al. (2003), Chen et al. (2007), Polk and Sapienza (2009), Ovtchinnikov and 
McConnell (2009), Campello and Graham (2013), and Hau and Lai (2013) suggests otherwise.1 
The evidence from our international sample further confirms that financial markets are not just a 
sideshow; they also affect corporate investment decisions.2 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literatures 
and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sources of our data. Section 4 presents the 
test results about the role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment. Section 5 
presents the test results about the role of the catering channel. Section 6 reports the results about 
joint effects of the two channels. Section 7 discusses the q-theory with investment frictions as an 
alternative explanation for some of our results. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
                                                          
1 A recent paper by Bai et al. (2016) documents that financial markets have become more informative over the 
longer horizon. More relevantly, prices have also been found to be important in influencing firms’ investment 
behavior. In addition, Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2014) contend that stock price overvaluation may affect the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Dong et al. (2016) further demonstrate that R&D 
spending is positively associated with stock price overvaluation. 
 
2 There are also related papers such as Hsu et al. (2015) and Sun (2016) which have examined the role of accounting 
standards and internal control weakness on firms’ investment. 
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2. Related literatures and hypothesis development 
2.1 The role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment 
Baker et al. (2003) extend the model of Stein (1996) and derive the implications of stock 
market mispricing for the role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment. They define 
a firm as equity dependent if its stock price is undervalued and its available capital is so low that 
it has to issue undervalued equity to achieve the first-best level of investment. They argue that 
stock market irrationality is unlikely to affect the investment decisions of non-equity-dependent 
firms (those with sufficient liquidity and no debt), since they do not rely on external financing. By 
contrast, equity-dependent firms will not want to issue equity in the external market when their 
stocks are undervalued, even if they need to raise funds for investment. The opposite is true in the 
case of overvaluation--equity-dependent firms are willing to issue equity to finance their 
investment when their stocks are overvalued. Therefore, equity-dependent firms have their 
investments that are more sensitive to the variation in the non-fundamental component of stock 
prices than non-equity-dependent firms.  
Our first hypothesis on the role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment 
follows that of Baker et al. (2003). Specifically, we hypothesize that: 
H1:  Under the equity-financing channel, investment is more sensitive to stock prices for equity-
dependent firms than for non-equity dependent firms in our international sample. 
 
2.2 The role of the catering channel in corporate investment 
Polk and Sapienza (2009) extend the model of Stein (1996) and derive the testable implications 
of stock market mispricing for the role of the catering channel in corporate investment.  We further 
extend their model to an international setting by allowing for the cross-country difference in the 
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cost of raising capital. Following Polk and Sapienza (2009) closely with the same notations, we 
assume that K is the capital at time 0 used by a firm to produce output and K0 is the initial capital 
right before time 0. The new investment, (K – K0), has a unit cost of c, if there is no market frictions. 
With market frictions, the cost of capital is c(1 + f), where f > 0, and can be interpreted as a measure 
of how difficult and costly it is for a firm to raise external capital. Therefore, f should be lower for 
firms located in more developed capital markets or in countries with easier access to equity markets 
or stronger legal protection.  
Due to investor irrationality or sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006), a firm’s stock price may 
be overvalued or undervalued from time to time. Hence we assume that the true value of the firm 
is V(K), while its market value is )()1()( KVKV t
mkt  , where t measures the degree of 
mispricing. The level of initial mispricing is  , which decays over time at a rate of p. That is, 
.ptt e
  A higher p value indicates a shorter duration, and therefore, faster disappearance of 
mispricing. A representative shareholder will have a liquidity need at some point in time. The 
arrival of this liquidity shock follows a Poison process with a mean arrival rate of ).,0( q  A 
larger q indicates that the shareholder horizon is shorter. The representative shareholder’s level of 
income (Yt) is the weighted average of the firm value before and after the true value of the firm is 
revealed.  That is, 
)1()()()1(
0
00 fcKKdtKVqeeY
t
qtpt  


 . 
The first-order condition is 

c
KV  )( , (1) 
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Assume that the optimal investment level is K*, which is the case where there is no mispricing 
(i.e., 0 ) and no market frictions (i.e., f = 0). In this case, .)( * cKV   The implication of 
equation (1) is that if managers cater to this short-term representative investor, they will overinvest 
when their stocks are overvalued (i.e., 0 ) and underinvest when they are undervalued (i.e., 
0 ). Polk and Sapienza (2009) also argue that the catering effect is stronger for firms with more 
short-term investors (i.e., larger q) and for firms whose assets are more difficult to evaluate (i.e., 
smaller p or longer durations of mispricing). In addition, our extended model suggests that the 
catering effect should also be more pronounced for firms located in countries with a lower cost of 
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3 Following Polk and Sapienza (2009), we assume that (q + p + q) > 0.  
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There is no ambiguity in the signs in equations (2) and (3). Although the signs in equations (4) 
and (5) are somewhat ambiguous, the results that 02 dqdKd   and 02 dpdKd   hold true if 
 > 0. But even if  < 0, the two results hold as long as ).1)(1(||
q
p
    
The catering theory suggests that investment is positively associated with the extent of stock 
market mispricing (equation (2)). We follow Baker et al. (2003) and use Tobin’s Q as our empirical 
proxy for  , the non-fundamental component of the stock price. In addition, equation (3) suggests 
that the positive sensitivity of investment to stock prices is more pronounced for firms located in 
countries with smaller market frictions (i.e., smaller f) than for firms located in countries with 
larger market frictions. If we average over the overvaluation and undervaluation regions, equations 
(4) to (5) suggest that, in most cases, firms located in countries with shorter shareholder horizons 
(i.e., larger q) or longer durations of mispricing (i.e., smaller p) make investments that are more 
sensitive to stock prices than firms located in countries with longer shareholder horizons or faster 
disappearance of mispricing. As mentioned at the outset, we focus on the country-level proxies for 
f, q, and p to test the cross-country implications of the catering channel. In particular, we measure 
market frictions by the extent of capital market development. Following Polk and Sapienza (2009), 
we measure shareholder horizons inversely by share turnover and durations of mispricing by R&D 
intensity. The above discussion leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2: Under the catering channel, investment is more sensitive to stock prices for firms located in 
countries with more developed capital markets, higher share turnover, or higher R&D intensity 
than for firms located in countries with less developed capital markets, lower share turnover, or 
lower R&D intensity. 
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2.3 The joint effects of the equity-financing channel and the catering channel on corporate 
investment 
 
We next examine how the joint effects of the equity-financing channel and the catering 
channel affect corporate investment decisions.  From the above discussion, we can easily form our 
third hypothesis. 
H3: Under both the equity-financing channel and the catering channel, the effect of the equity-
financing channel on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock prices is more pronounced 
for firms located in countries with more developed capital markets, higher share turnover, or 
higher R&D intensity than for firms located in countries with less developed capital markets, lower 
share turnover, or lower R&D intensity. 
 
3. Data and variables 
We collect two sets of data. The first set consists of firm-level financial data available from 
Worldscope and Datastream, both of which are provided by Thomson Financial. After eliminating 
countries with less than 100 firm-year observations, we manage to retrieve firm-level data for 44 
countries. For each firm, we collect financial variables that include capital expenditures (including 
property, plant, and equipment; research and development; and acquisitions), cash flow, cash 
balances, cash dividends, total debt, total assets, and the book value of equity from Worldscope; 
and the market value of equity and stock returns from Datastream.  
We exclude firms with missing firm-year observations, firms operating in the financial 
industry (i.e., firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), and firms with a book value of total 
assets of less than US$10 million.4  Overall, our filtering process yields an unbalanced panel of 
                                                          
4 We use the exchange rates from Datastream to convert the book value of total assets from local currencies to US 
dollars. 
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239,307 firm-year observations from 44 countries. The sample period is from 1982 to 2008. Table 
1 presents the sample distribution in terms of the country-level institutional variables. The second 
column of Table 1 reports the total number of firm-year observations for each country in the final 
sample. Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States dominate the sample, each with more 
than 20,000 firm-year observations.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
3.1 Country-level variables 
Our second dataset includes data on three country-level institutional variables and two country 
characteristics. To test equation (3), we need to proxy for the cross-country difference in the cost 
of raising external equity capital. Recent studies have found that the cost of equity capital tends to 
be lower in countries with more developed financial markets and better corporate governance (Hail 
and Leuz, 2006; Chen et al., 2009).5 Therefore, our first variable is the access-to-equity market 
index (ACCESS) obtained from La Porta et al. (2006). This variable measures the extent of access 
to the equity market. A higher score on this index indicates that a firm can more easily access the 
equity market, and so the cost associated with raising external equity is lower. Our second country-
level variable represents whether a country belongs to the developed market or not. We follow 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to classify the countries in our sample into 23 developed 
markets and 21 emerging markets. We construct a dummy variable, DEV, which is equal to 1 for 
firms in the developed markets and 0 for firms in the emerging markets.  
We employ the country-level share turnover (TURNOVER) index to proxy for average 
shareholder horizons. This index is obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators and is 
                                                          
5 In addition, several recent studies have documented that country-level institutions are important determinants of 
corporate investment decisions (Wurgler, 2000; McLean et al., 2012). In the context of our study, these institutional 
variables will influence managers’ abilities to exploit the mispricing to raise external equity to finance investment 
needs (McLean et al., 2010).  
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calculated as the annual average of the total value of stocks traded as a fraction the total value of 
shares outstanding (%) for the period from 1996 to 2005. A higher TURNOVER index indicates a 
shorter shareholder horizon. Finally, we create a country-level R&D intensity (RD) index to proxy 
for the average opacity of a firm’s assets. This index is calculated by taking the average of the 
firm-level research and development expenditures (R&D) divided by total sales for all firms with 
a positive value of R&D expenditures.6 A higher RD index indicates that the average assets of a 
firm are more opaque and more difficult to value.  
The third to the sixth columns of Table 1 present the scores of ACCESS, TURNOVER, and RD 
in each country. ACCESS ranges from 2.78 (Columbia) to 6.74 (United States); TURNOVER 
ranges from 7.07% (Columbia) to 314.7% (Taiwan); and RD ranges from 0 (Columbia, Egypt, and 
Venezuela) to 4.7% (United States). Panels A and B of Table 1 also report the means and standard 
deviations of the four country-level variables for the developed and emerging markets, respectively. 
We observe that developed countries have easier access to capital markets, stronger legal 
protection, and higher R&D intensity. The overall means (standard deviations) of ACCESS, 
TURNOVER, and RD are 5.18 (0.91), 77.24% (69.81%), and 1.1% (1.6%), respectively. 
  
3.2 Firm-level measures of financial variables 
We use three measures of corporate investment. The first measure is capital investment (CAPX) 
calculated as capital expenditures in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. The second 
measure, CAPRD, is defined as the sum of capital expenditures and research and development 
expenditures in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. The third measure, CAPXRDA, 
                                                          
6 We follow the previous studies to assign a value of 0 if the value of R&D expenditures is missing. 
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is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, research and development expenditures, and 
acquisitions in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1.  
Cash flow (CF) is calculated as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. Similar to Baker, Stein, and 
Wurgler (2003), we use Tobin’s Q (Q) as our main measure of the non-fundamental component of 
the stock price. Q is calculated as the market value of equity (i.e., the stock price multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding) plus total assets minus the book value of equity divided by total 
assets at the end of year t-1. In our robustness tests, we also use returns (RET) as an alternative 
measure. RET is calculated as the change in stock price from the end of year t-2 to the end of year 
t-1.7 We winsorize all financial variables at the 1st and 99th percentile levels to minimize the outlier 
problem. 
 
3.3 Firm-level measures of equity dependence 
Our main measure of equity dependence is the financial flexibility (FF) index. Following 
Doidge et al. (2009), we first compute the 75th percentile of cash balance (CASH) and dividend 
payout ratios (DIV), as well as the 25th percentile of CAPX for each country. A firm is considered 
financially flexible if it has high values of CASH and DIV and a low value of CAPX. More 
specifically, it will be assigned a value of 1 if its CASH value or DIV value is greater than the 75th 
percentile or its CAPX value is below the 25th percentile. In this respect, the FF score ranges from 
0 to 3. Firms with lower FF scores are considered less financially flexible and therefore more 
equity dependent. In our robustness tests, we also use the adjusted KZ index originally constructed 
                                                          
7 In our untabulated tests, we repeat all the empirical analyses using RET as an alternative measure of stock prices and 
obtain results that are similar to those when Tobin’s Q is used. 
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by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) based on a sample of 49 low-dividend manufacturing firms in the 
United States as an alternative measure of equity dependence.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the financial variables. The mean 
(median) value of CAPX across the 44 sample countries is 7.4% (4.6%). This is slightly lower than 
the mean (median) of 8.2% (6.0%) reported by Baker et al. (2003) for the sample of U.S. firms. In 
addition, the mean (median) values of CAPXRD and CAPXRDA are 9.5% (6.1%) and 11.5% 
(6.9%), respectively. The mean (median) value of CF is 11.5% (12%), while the mean (median) 
value of the logarithm of Q is 0.3 (0.2). The mean (median) value of the FF index is 1.2 (1.0).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Additionally, we present the correlations among the firm-level variables and among the 
country-level institutional variables in Panels B and C of Table 2, respectively.8 All three measures 
of corporate investment (CAPX, CAPXRD, and CAPXRDA) are positively correlated with Q and 
CF.  These preliminary findings are consistent with the evidence reported in the literature in the 
United States (e.g., Baker et al., 2003). The correlations among the country-level variables are all 
in the expected signs (i.e., positive) for most of the variables, with the magnitudes ranging from -
0.002 to 0.61. 
 
4. The role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment 
In this section, we first investigate if the empirical evidence found in U.S. firms for the role 
of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment (Baker et al., 2003) can be extended to our 
international sample. Following Fazzari et al. (1988) and Baker et al. (2003), we first estimate the 
following baseline investment equation: 
                                                          
8 The country median values of financial variables are used to compute the correlation coefficients. 
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itititoit ucCFbQaCAPX  1 , (6), 
where CAPXit is the corporate investment of firm i in year t, Qit-1 is firm i’s Tobin’s Q in year t-1, 
and CFit is its cash flow in year t. All these variables are scaled by total assets. The regression 
coefficient b measures the sensitivity of corporate investment to the stock price (as proxied by Q) 
and the regression coefficient c measures the sensitivity of investment to cash flow.  We use the 
panel regression model with country fixed effects to estimate equation (6) for the pooled sample.9 
uit is the error term which is assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables. To mitigate 
the problems of within-firm serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, we conduct our tests by 
estimating White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors, clustered by country. 
In our unreported results, the estimated coefficients of b and c are 0.957 (t-statistic = 17.01) 
and 0.125 (t-statistic = 29.99), respectively. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The finding for our international sample corroborates the prevailing results that both Q and 
CF are positively and significantly correlated with CAPX. Replacing CAPX in equation (6) with 
CAPXRD or CAPXRDA yields similar results. 
 
4.1 Baseline results 
Our next task is to test the role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment in the 
international setting. As elaborated earlier, we use the financial flexibility index (FF) as our inverse 
measure of equity dependence to test H1. It is noted that the degree of equity dependence decreases 
with the FF score. We first assign firms to quartile portfolios according to their FF scores, where 
FF1 represents the portfolio of firms with the FF score of 0, and FF4 represents the portfolio of 
firms with the FF score of 3. Firms in the FF1 quartile are the most equity dependent, while firms 
                                                          
9 We also estimate all our regressions using firm fixed effects and country random effects models and obtain similar 
results. The results are available upon request. 
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in the FF4 quartile are the least equity dependent. Following Baker et al. (2003), the assignment 
of firms is based on the firm’s median FF scores over the whole sample period. 
We then estimate the baseline investment equation (6) separately for each FF quartile portfolio 
using the country fixed effects model with year and industry dummies. We follow Fama and 
French (1997) in defining the industry classification of our firms. H1 predicts that the sensitivity 
of corporate investment to stock prices should decrease (increase) with the degree of financial 
flexibility (equity dependence). That is, b should decrease with FF quartiles.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the estimation results of equation (6) for portfolios formed using 
FF and with CAPX as the dependent variable. We observe that the coefficient on Q (i.e., b) 
decreases from 5.194 in the bottom FF quartile to 0.075 in the top FF quartile. We also compute 
the p-value of the F-statistic which essentially tests the hypothesis that the difference in the b 
coefficient between the top and bottom quartile portfolios is zero. We find that the p-value is 
smaller than 0.01. Our evidence indicates that corporate investment is significantly more sensitive 
to stock prices for less financially flexible (or equity-dependent) firms than for more financially 
flexible (or non-equity-dependent) firms in our international sample.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Similarly, Panels B and C of Table 3 present the regression results when the dependent 
variable is replaced by CAPXRD and CAPXRDA, respectively. All the results are consistent with 
the findings reported in Panel A of Table 3. That is, the sensitivity of investment to stock prices in 
general declines with the degree of financial flexibility. More specifically, when CAPXRD is the 
measure of corporate investment, the regression coefficient on Q is 7.076 for the FF1 quartile and 
2.018 for the FF4 quartile. The difference in the b coefficient between the FF1 quartile and the 
FF4 quartile is significantly positive at the 1% level. When CAPXRDA is the measure of corporate 
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investment, the results are even stronger. The regression coefficient on Q is 9.642 for the FF1 
quartile but only 2.993 for the FF4 quartile. The difference in the b coefficient between the two 
extreme quartiles is also statistically significant at the 1% level.   
As an alternative specification to test H1, we estimate the following regression for the pooled 
sample: 
,)( 111 ititititititoit udFFcCFFFQbbQaCAPX    (7) 
where FF is the financial flexibility index. The other variables are defined previously. We include 
the interaction term between Q and FF as an additional explanatory variable. The coefficient of 
interest in this case is b1 and we expect the interaction coefficient to be negative (i.e., b1 < 0). That 
is, corporate investment is less sensitive to the stock price for financially flexible firms than for 
financially inflexible firms. Panel D of Table 3 reports the estimation results of equation (7). We 
find that the coefficient of the interaction term, b1, is negative and highly significant for all three 
measures of corporate investment at the 1% level.  More specifically, b1 is -2.148, -1.922, and -
3.018, when the dependent variable is CAPX, CAPXRD, and CAPXRDA, respectively.  
In summary, the empirical results in Table 3 are consistent with H1 and extend the findings 
of Baker et al. (2003) to our international sample. We conclude that the equity-financing channel 
at the firm level explains for the positive relation between corporate investment and stock prices 
among firms in our international sample.10  
 
 
4.2 Inclusion of alternative measures of investment opportunities 
                                                          
10 The dependent variable that we use in the subsequent analysis is CAPX. We continue to obtain robust results for the 
other two alternative measures of CAPX. These results are available upon request. 
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Our regression specifications might suffer from potential problems related to Tobin’s Q which 
we use in this study as a proxy for the non-fundamental component of stock prices. In particular, 
one alternative explanation for our finding is that corporate investment is simply responding to 
investment opportunities. Past studies have also used Tobin’s Q as a measure of growth 
opportunities. To test the robustness of our results, we include two alternative measures of growth 
opportunities (TAG or SG) separately in the estimation of equation (6) as an additional control 
variable.  TAG is total assets growth and is calculated as the change in total assets from the end of 
year t-1 to the end of year t, divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. SG is sales growth and is 
calculated as the change in total sales from year t-1 to year t, divided by total sales in year t-1.  
The results are presented in Panels A and B of Table 4. Our finding of a monotonic decline in 
the magnitude of the regression coefficient on Q from the least financially flexible firms (FF1) to 
the most financially flexible firms (FF4) persists, regardless of which additional measure of 
growth opportunities is included in the regression.  More specifically, the regression coefficient 
on Q decreases monotonically from 3.653 (3.980) in the FF1 group to 0.075 (0.0071) in the FF4 
group when TAG (SG) is included in the regression to proxy for investment opportunities.  The 
difference in the coefficient between the two extreme groups is significant at the 1% level in both 
cases. We further include TAG (or SG) and the interaction term between TAG (or SG) and FF in 
the estimation of equation (7) for the pooled sample. The result from Panel C of Table 4 shows 
that the coefficient on FFQ  continues to be negative with a value of -1.528 (-1.567), when TAG 
(SG) and its interaction with FF are also included in the regression. Both coefficients are highly 
significant at the 1% level. Therefore, our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of other 
measures of growth opportunities. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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4.3 Results from country-by-country analysis 
We next examine whether the role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment as 
documented in Table 3 is stronger in some countries than in others. Moreover, we acknowledge 
that the measurements of CAPX, Q, and CF are affected by differences in accounting methods and 
reporting incentives across countries. In order to mitigate this concern, we estimate equation (7) 
for each of the countries in our international sample. Table 5 presents the results for the country-
by-country analysis. For the sake of brevity, we only present the regression coefficient and 
standard error of FFQ . The regressions yield negative interaction coefficients in 35 out of the 
44 countries in our international sample.  In addition, among those negative coefficients, 15 are 
significant at the 10% level or better. Therefore, the results in Table 5 illustrate that the equity-
financing channel affects corporate investment in most countries in our sample, albeit to different 
degrees in different countries. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.4 Robustness checks 
In this section, we perform a series of robustness checks to examine if our results are sensitive 
to alternative specifications and sub-samples. First, we re-estimate equation (7) using the Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) methodology. The result is reported in Column (1) of Table 6. The coefficient 
on FFQ remains negative and highly significant with a value of -2.016. The estimated 
coefficient is very close to that estimated using the industry- and year-fixed effect ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method reported in Panel D of Table 3. However, the standard error is reduced 
substantially from 0.495 to 0.127. There is a great variation in the number of firm-year 
observations among the 44 countries in our sample. To mitigate the concern that our results might 
be driven by a large number of observations from the larger countries, we re-estimate equation (7) 
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using the weighted least squares (WLS) methodology, where the weight is the inverse of the 
number of firms in each country in each year. The result is presented in Column (2) of Table 6. 
The coefficient on FFQ is slightly reduced to -1.796, which is still highly significant; the 
standard error of 0.482 remains very close to the 0.495 reported in Panel D of Table 3.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
We then exclude Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States from our sample to check 
if our results would still hold because these three countries dominate our sample observations.  The 
result is presented in Column (3) of Table 6. We also test our results for the sample of 
manufacturing firms only (SIC codes 2000 to 3999).  The finding is reported in Column (4) of 
Table 6.  The results in both Columns (3) and (4) are similar to the results from the overall sample-
-the coefficient on FFQ is negative and highly significant in both cases.11 
We next replace the dependent variable by total assets growth (TAG) or the change in 
investment (i.e., ΔCAPX, calculated as the change in capital investment from time t-1 to t, divided 
by total assets at the end of year t-1). The results are reported in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6. 
We also replace Tobin’s Q by annual stock returns in the previous year (i.e., RET, calculated as 
the change in stock prices from the end of year t-2 to the end of year t-1). The result is presented 
in Column (7) of Table 6. We then replace the FF index with the KZ index (i.e., the adjusted 
Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index) as our measure of equity dependence.12 The result is shown in 
Column (8) of Table 6. Since the KZ index is a direct measure of equity dependence, we expect 
                                                          
11 In addition, our results (unreported) remain robust even after excluding the periods of financial crises (1987, 1998 
to 2000, and 2008) and in the different sub-periods (pre-1990, 1990 to 2000, and post-2000).   
 
12 Baker et al. (2003) use the KZ-index as their main measure of equity dependence and find similar results for U.S. 
firms. The KZ score is estimated for each firm-year observation using an equation that comprises five components. 
The estimated coefficients of cash flow (CF), dividend payout ratios (DIV), and cash balance (CASH) are negatively 
associated with the KZ index, while leverage (LEV) and Tobin’s Q are positively associated with the KZ index. 
Therefore, firms with a higher KZ score are considered more equity dependent or more reliant on external equity 
financing for their investment projects.  
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the interaction coefficient on KZQ  to be positive. We also include the interaction term between 
CF and FF )( FFCF   in the regression. The result is reported in Column (9) of Table 6. Finally, 
we include contemporaneous Q (denoted as Qt) and lagged investment (denoted as LCAPX) in our 
regression specification. The reason for including LCAPX is because a firm’s actual investment 
occurs with a lag (Lamont, 2000). The result is presented in Column (10) of Table 6. The results 
in Columns (5)-(10), except Column (8), show that the regression coefficients on the interaction 
term )( FFQ  are all negative and highly significant, while the interaction coefficient on 
)( KZQ  reported in Column (8) is positive and highly significant.13 
In summary, our sensitivity tests show that our main finding of a positive effect of equity 
dependence or a negative effect of financial flexibility on the sensitivity of investment to stock 
prices in our international sample survives all robustness checks. This suggests that the role of the 
equity-financing channel in corporate investment decisions is robust.  
 
5. The role of the catering channel in corporate investment 
In this section, we formally examine whether the catering channel also plays an important role 
in corporate investment. In particular, H2 posits that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices 
should be higher for firms located in countries where the costs associated with raising external 
equity capital for investment needs are lower, or for firms whose shareholders have shorter 
investment horizons, or for firms whose assets are more difficult to value. To test this hypothesis, 
we first partition our whole sample into two sub-samples according to the median value of 
ACCESS, TURNOVER, or RD, or whether the dummy variable DEV is 0 or 1. We then estimate 
                                                          
13 We also use firm size, which is computed as the natural logarithm of total assets, as another alternative measure of 
equity dependence. The smaller the firm is, the more equity dependent it should be. Our results remain unchanged. 
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equation (6) for each of the two sub-samples. The prediction from the first part of H2 is that the 
sensitivity of corporate investment to stock prices is higher in countries where the cost of raising 
external equity is lower and is lower in countries where the financing cost is higher.  
Panel A of Table 7 present the estimation results of equation (6) for the two sub-samples based 
on the above two country-level institutional variables (ACCESS and DEV). Consistent with the 
prediction of H2, we find that sensitivities of investment to stock prices (as measured by the 
coefficient of b in equation (6)) are higher for the sub-sample of firms located in countries with a 
high score on ACCESS, and for firms in developed markets than for firms in the other sub-samples. 
For example, when ACCESS is used as a measure of external-financing costs, the estimated 
coefficient of b increases from 1.456 in the low sub-sample to 4.291 in the high sub-sample. Both 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. We also conduct the F-test which 
essentially tests the hypothesis that the difference in the coefficient of b between the high and low 
sub-samples is zero. As expected, the F-statistic is positive and highly significant at the 1% level 
or better. Investment is also significantly more sensitive to stock prices for firms in developed 
markets (with b = 4.056) than for firms in emerging markets (b = 1.602).  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The second part of H2 predicts that corporate investment is also more sensitive to stock prices 
for firms located in countries where shareholders have shorter horizons and for firms whose 
average assets are more opaque. We find the results to be consistent with the predictions of the 
catering theory (Panel A of Table 7) when we use TURNOVER as an inverse measure of average 
shareholder horizons and RD as a direct measure of asset opacity. For example, when TURNOVER 
is the partitioning variable, the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is 3.947 for the high 
TURNOVER sub-sample firms and 2.693 for the low TURNOVER sub-sample firms. When RD is 
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the partitioning variable, the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is 3.933 for the high RD sub-
sample firms and 1.843 for the low RD sub-sample firms. The difference in the regression 
coefficient of Q between the high and low sub-samples is significant at the 1% level or better in 
both cases. 
As an alternative specification to test H2, we estimate the following regression for the pooled 
sample using the random effects model: 
,)( 1211 titiitiitoit ucCFCOUNTRYQbCOUNTRYbbQaCAPX    (8) 
where COUNTRY is a dummy variable that equals 1 for countries with a high score on ACCESS, 
TURNOVER, or RD, and for developed countries, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest in 
this case is the coefficient on the interaction term between Q and COUNTRY, b2. H2 predicts that 
the coefficient of b2 should be positive.  We estimate equation (8) by including the interaction of 
each of the five country-level variables with Tobin’s Q as an additional regressor.  Panel B of 
Table 7 presents the estimation results for the pooled sample. Consistent with the findings in Panel 
A of Table 7, we find that the coefficients of the interaction term (i.e., b2) are all positive and 
significant at the 10% level or better.  More specifically, b2 is significant at the 1% level for Q 
interacted with ACCESS or DEV, at the 5% level for Q interacted with TURNOVER, and at the 10% 
level for Q interacted with RD. The results again appear to support H2.14  
Our findings in this section highlight the important roles that the various country-level 
variables which proxy for the costs of raising external capital, average shareholder horizons, and 
opacity of assets, play in the relation between corporate investment and stock prices. In general, 
our results suggest that the non-fundamental component of stock prices is a better predictor of 
investment for firms in countries where the costs of raising external equity are lower, or where 
                                                          
14 In our unreported results, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term between our country-level variables 
and CF is negative and significant at the 1% level for all five country-level variables. 
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average shareholder horizons are shorter, or for firms whose assets are more difficult to evaluate. 
The results support the catering theory of investment proposed by Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
 
6. The joint roles of the equity-financing and catering channels in corporate investment 
 
In this section, we explore the joint effects of the equity-financing and catering channels on 
corporate investment behavior in our international sample. Specifically, we test whether the ability 
of managers to engage in market timing is attenuated or intensified in countries with a lower 
external equity-financing cost.  
We continue to use the partitioned samples based on each of the country-level variables used 
in the previous section and re-estimate equation (7) for each of them. The investment regressions 
are estimated using the country fixed effects model, with year and industry dummies and White’s 
heteroskedasticity-corrected clustered standard errors. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 
8. When ACCESS is used as the country-level partitioning variable, we find that the coefficient on 
the interaction term between Q and FF is more negative in the high ACCESS sub-sample (-2.070) 
than in the low ACCESS sub-sample (-1.329). This is consistent with our hypothesis that the role 
of the equity-financing channel is more pronounced in countries with easier access to equity 
markets. Moreover, the F-statistic that tests the difference in the coefficient on FFQ  between 
the two sub-samples is highly significant with a p-value of less than 0.01.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
We also find that the effect of the equity-financing channel is significantly stronger (with a p-
value of less than 0.01) for firms in developed markets (coefficient of QFF = -2.242) than for 
firms in emerging markets (coefficient of QFF = -1.533).  The same pattern is also found for 
firms split by TURNOVER, or RD. The coefficient of QFF is -2.236 (-2.215) for firms from the 
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high TURNOVER (RD) sub-sample and -1.534 (-1.532) for firms from the low TURNOVER (RD) 
sub-sample. The differences in the estimated coefficients of QFF between the two sub-samples 
are highly significant at the 1% level or better with the correct signs in all three cases. 
As an alternative specification to test H3, we estimate the following regression for the pooled 
sample using the random effects model: 
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 (9) 
where all variables are defined previously. We include three interaction terms, QFF, 
QCOUNTRY, and QFFCOUNTRY, as additional explanatory variables. The coefficient of 
interest in this case is b3 and we expect this coefficient to be negative. That is, corporate investment 
is more sensitive to stock prices for non-financially flexible (i.e., equity-dependent) firms than for 
financially flexible (i.e., non-equity-dependent) firms and the effect of this equity-financing 
channel should be stronger in countries where the external financing costs are lower, or where 
shareholders have shorter horizons, or for firms whose assets are more difficult to value.  
Panel B of Table 8 presents the estimation results of equation (9). In all specifications, we find 
that the coefficient of the interaction term COUNTRYFFQ   is negative with a value ranging 
from -1.232 to -1.693 and is highly significant at the 1% level. These findings are consistent with 
the argument that managers of equity-dependent firms will invest more in response to an increase 
in their stock price when the associated costs of raising external equity are lower, which is the case 
in countries with more developed institutions. Therefore, more developed institutions allow 
managers who are adept at timing the market to exploit the mispricing in stock prices. In addition, 
consistent with the evidence in Panel B of Table 7, we find that the coefficient of QCOUNTRY 
continues to be positive for all specifications at the 1% level.  Furthermore, consistent with the 
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evidence in Panel D of Table 3 and Panel C of Table 4, the coefficient of QFF continues to be 
negative and significant at the 1% level for all five specifications.   
Finally, we also include two interaction terms, COUNTRYQ and COUNTRYFFQ  , and 
repeat the robustness tests in Section 3.4. Our findings (unreported) are unchanged. That is, the 
interaction coefficient on COUNTRYQ retains its expected positive sign, while the coefficients 
on FFQ  and on COUNTRYFFQ  remain negative and significant at least at the conventional 
levels. On the whole, our results suggest that the equity-financing channel and the catering channel 
work together in driving managers’ investment decisions for our international sample 
 
7. An alternative interpretation of some of our results: the q-theory 
Equation (3) states that the positive relation between corporate investment and stock 
mispricing is stronger for firms in countries with low market frictions than for firms in countries 
with high market frictions. This relation is also consistent with the q-theory with investment 
frictions or adjustment costs proposed by Cochrane (1991, 1996), Li and Zhang (2010), among 
others. The q-theory with investment frictions proposed by Li and Zhang (2010) suggests that 
corporate investment is more responsive to the change in the cost of capital for firms in countries 
with low investment frictions than for firms in countries with high investment frictions. The 
measures of investment frictions would be empirically distinguishable from the measures of 
market frictions. Therefore, if the change in the cost of capital reflects the change in mispricing, 
our results in Tables 7 and 8 are also supportive of the q-theory with investment frictions when 
ACCESS, DEV, and ANTISELF are used as the inverse measures of market frictions. 15  
                                                          
15 Li and Zhang (2010) have shown that ,0
dR
dK
d
d

 where  > 0 is a cost parameter (i.e., a measure of investment 
frictions) and R is the gross discount rate.  Since the market value of a firm (Vmkt) and its expected cost of capital (R) 
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Although the predictions from the q-theory and the catering theory are the same, the underlying 
intuitions and assumptions are different. The q-theory assumes that the stock market is always 
rational, but the cost of capital may change from time to time and across firms due to the change 
in investor risk aversion. Managers of firms will invest more when the expected cost of capital is 
lower and invest less when the expected cost of capital is higher. On the other hand, the catering 
theory assumes that due to investor irrationality, stock markets may be overvalued or undervalued 
from time to time and across firms. If mangers are assumed to cater to short-term shareholders, 
they will invest more when their shares are overvalued and invest less when their shares are 
undervalued.   
 
8. Conclusions 
We have investigated how stock market mispricing affects corporate investment decisions 
through the equity-financing channel proposed by Baker et al. (2003) and the catering channel 
suggested by Polk and Sapienza (2009) using an international sample covering 44 countries. Our 
first main result is that the previous finding that the equity-financing channel affects the sensitivity 
of corporate investment to stock prices extends to our international sample. We have then shown 
that corporate investment is more sensitive to stock prices for firms in countries with more 
developed capital markets, higher share turnover, and higher R&D intensity. Since the degree of 
capital market development proxies for the cost of raising external capital, the result is consistent 
with the prediction of the extended catering theory of investment. In addition, by examining the 
interaction between firm-level equity dependence and country-level institutions, we have found 
                                                          
are negatively correlated (i.e., 0
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  Since  is analogous to our measure 
of market frictions (f) and Vmk is positively associated with our measure of mispricing (), our equation (3) is 
equivalent to Li and Zhang’s equation (6). 
 28 
that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is most pronounced for equity-dependent firms in 
countries with more developed capital markets, higher share turnover, and higher R&D intensity. 
The analysis based on capital market development suggests that managers of equity-dependent 
firms are better able to engage in market timing in countries where the costs of raising external 
equity are relatively lower. 
As an aside, we have provided corroborating evidence that helps to explain the cross-country 
difference in the determinants of corporate investment decisions. In addition, by using the 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices as a measure of the efficiency of capital allocation as 
Baker et al. (2003) have done, we have shown that the presence of strong institutions enables 
equity-dependent firms to allocate capital to investment projects more efficiently, through the 
equity-financing channel and the catering channel. 
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Appendix: Variable definition 
 
Variable name Definition Source 
Country-level variables 
ACCESS Access to external equity index La Porta et al. (2006) 
DEV A dummy variable which equals 1 for developed countries and 0 
for emerging countries. 
IMF 
TURNOVER Share turnover index, calculated as the average total value of 
stocks traded as a fraction of the shares outstanding for the period 
1996-2005. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators at 
http://www.worldbank.org 
RD R&D intensity, calculated as the average of firm-level research 
and development expenditures divided by total sales. 
Worldscope 
Firm-Level Variables 
CAPX Capital investment, calculated as capital expenditures in year t 
divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
Worldscope 
CAPXRD Alternative measure of capital investment, calculated as capital 
expenditures plus research and development expenditures in year 
t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
Worldscope 
CAPXRDA Alternative measure of capital investment, calculated as capital 
expenditures plus research and development expenditures plus 
acquisitions in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
Worldscope 
FF Financial flexibility index Doidge et al. (2009)  
Q The logarithm of Tobin’s Q, calculated as market value of equity 
plus total assets minus total equity in year t-1divided by total 
assets at the end of year t-1.  
Worldscope 
CF Cash flow, calculated as income before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and amortization in year t divided by total assets at 
the end of year t-1. 
Worldscope 
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Table 1 
Country-level variables. This table presents the country-level variables for our sample. ACCESS is a country-level 
measure of ease of access to external equity markets. TURNOVER is the share turnover index. RD is the R&D 
intensity index. The detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. The sample consists of 44 
countries and covers the period from 1982 to 2008. 
 
Panel A: Developed markets 
Country 
 
Firm-year 
observations 
ACCESS 
 
TURNOVER 
 
           RD 
 
Australia  6,846 6.00 64.08 0.018 
Austria  1,122 4.89 36.10 0.011 
Belgium  1,492 5.70 27.91 0.013 
Canada  10,648 6.39 62.12 0.029 
Denmark  2,072 5.87 69.68 0.021 
Finland  1,699 6.37 80.77 0.022 
France  8,726 5.75 77.60 0.013 
Germany  8,289 5.93 107.82 0.018 
Greece  1,253 5.28 58.71 0.003 
Hong Kong  5,932 5.50 54.12 0.004 
Ireland  932 5.29 48.51 0.010 
Italy  2,976 4.41 96.87 0.009 
Japan  34,950 4.92 69.52 0.014 
The Netherlands  2,708 6.43 112.11 0.012 
New Zealand  901 5.82 38.40 0.004 
Norway  1,851 5.57 87.98 0.015 
Portugal  696 4.50 59.98 0.000 
Singapore  4,076 5.50 47.17 0.003 
Spain  1,969 5.09 172.89 0.003 
Sweden  3,128 6.15 95.72 0.032 
Switzerland  2,787 6.07 89.37 0.027 
United Kingdom  20,758 6.26 81.11 0.020 
United States  68,482 6.74 140.88 0.047 
Mean  5.67 77.37 0.015 
Std dev  0.62 34.00 0.011 
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Table 1 - Continued 
 
Panel B: Emerging markets 
Country 
 
Firm-year 
observations 
ACCESS 
 
TURNOVER 
 
         RD 
 
Argentina  539 3.23 16.563 0.000 
Brazil  2,104 4.05 47.499 0.001 
Chile  1,418 4.80 10.020 0.000 
Colombia  209 2.78 7.070 0.000 
Egypt  139 5.20 24.279 0.000 
India  5,228 5.30 152.992 0.004 
Indonesia  1,862 4.53 45.155 0.000 
Israel  895 5.35 45.973 0.086 
Korea (South) 6,992 5.02 247.772 0.009 
Malaysia  6,632 5.11 39.230 0.001 
Mexico  1,080 3.90 30.437 0.000 
Pakistan  935 . 286.200 0.000 
Peru  511 3.84 14.485 0.002 
Philippines  1,008 4.62 23.812 0.001 
South Africa  3,271 5.94 34.400 0.002 
Sri Lanka  159 . 17.242 0.000 
Taiwan  7,825 5.54 314.740 0.024 
Thailand  3,165 4.24 79.703 0.000 
Turkey  1,368 5.03 156.107 0.003 
Venezuela  148 3.51 10.771 0.000 
Zimbabwe  126 4.93 14.543 0.003 
Mean  4.57 77.095 0.006 
Std dev  0.84 95.955 0.019 
Overall mean  5.18 77.237 0.011 
Overall Std dev  0.91 69.813 0.016 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics. Panel A of this table presents the summary statistics of the financial variables. CAPX is a measure of capital investment. CAPXRD is a 
measure of CAPX plus R&D expenditures. CAPXRDA is a measure of CAPXRD plus acquisitions. Ln(Q) is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. 
FF is the financial flexibility index. Panel B presents the correlations among the firm-level financial variables. Panel C presents the Pearson correlations among 
the country-level variables. ACCESS is a country-level measure of ease of access to external equity. DEV is a dummy variable that equals one for developed 
countries and zero for emerging countries. TURNOVER is the share turnover index. RND is the R&D intensity index. The detailed definitions of these variables 
are provided in the Appendix. The sample period is from 1982 to 2008.  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std dev Min Max 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile 
CAPX (%) 239,907 7.389 4.581 10.022 0.000 88.686 2.057 8.799 
CAPXRD (%) 239,907 9.480 6.061 12.421 0.000 130.359 2.745 11.558 
CAPXRDA (%) 239,907 11.524 6.860 16.723 0.000 165.624 3.049 13.453 
Ln(Q) 239,907 0.300 0.191 0.524 -0.736 3.483 -0.032 0.532 
CF (%) 239,907 11.459 12.007 20.114 -443.100 75.238 5.851 18.785 
FF 239,907 1.155 1.000 0.715 0.000 3.000 1.000 2.000 
Panel B: Correlations among firm-level variables 
Variable CAPX CAPXRD CAPXRDA Ln(Q) CF    
CAPXRD 0.859        
CAPXRDA 0.687 0.800       
Ln(Q) 0.203 0.333 0.333      
CF 0.151 0.129 0.134 0.321     
FF 0.124 -0.030 -0.003 0.072 0.179    
Panel C: Correlations among country-level institutional variables 
 ACCESS DEV TURNOVER     
DEV  0.608       
TURNOVER 0.336 0.002      
RD 0.501 0.274 0.159     
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Table 3 
Financial flexibility and corporate investment. Panels A to C of this table present the coefficients of investment 
regressions based on equation (6) in the main text for each portfolio formed according to the measures of financial 
flexibility. The dependent variables are CAPX, CAPXRD, and CAPXRDA, respectively. CAPX is a measure of 
capital investment. CAPXRD is a measure of CAPX plus R&D expenditures. CAPXRDA is a measure of CAPXRD 
plus acquisitions. Q is Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. FF is the financial flexibility index. The detailed definitions of 
these variables are provided in the Appendix. Panel D presents the results for the pooled sample obtained by 
including the interaction term, Q  FF. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by country and robust 
to heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
Variables 
 
 (1) 
FF1 
(2) 
FF2 
(3) 
FF3 
(4) 
FF4 
Panel A: CAPX is the dependent variable 
Q  5.194*** 5.085*** 2.359*** 0.075*** 
  (0.897) (0.630) (0.260) (0.027) 
CF  0.073*** 0.016 0.089*** 0.003*** 
  (0.012) (0.018) (0.031) (0.001) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  37,222 136,549 57,807 8,329 
R-squared  0.252 0.144 0.184 0.371 
Panel B: CAPXRD is the dependent variable 
Q  7.076*** 8.505*** 5.733*** 2.018*** 
  (0.253) (0.163) (0.210) (0.303) 
CF  0.038*** -0.054 -0.034*** -0.076*** 
  (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.021) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  37,222 136,549 57,807 8,329 
R-squared  0.229 0.190 0.180 0.266 
Panel C: CAPXRDA is the dependent variable 
Q  9.642*** 10.770*** 7.029*** 2.992*** 
  (0.325) (0.203) (0.257) (0.398) 
CF  0.089*** -0.050*** -0.006 -0.057** 
  (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.024) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  37,222 136,549 57,807 8,329 
R-squared  0.206 0.179 0.147 0.129 
Panel D: Pooled sample regressions  
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
CAPX 
(2) 
CAPXRD 
(3) 
CAPXRDA 
Q 6.868*** 9.703*** 9.808*** 
 (1.059) (0.881) (1.113) 
CF 0.043** -0.038 0.065*** 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.018) 
FF -2.371*** -2.127*** -2.490*** 
 (0.182) (0.175) (0.255) 
Q  FF -2.148*** -1.922*** -3.018*** 
 (0.495) (0.577) (0.430) 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 239,907 239,907 239,907 
R-Squared 0.191 0.199 0.159 
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Table 4 
Financial flexibility and corporate investment controlling for investment opportunities. Panels A and B of this table 
present the investment regression coefficients based on equation (7) for each portfolio formed according to the 
measures of financial flexibility (FF). The dependent variable is CAPX. CAPX is a measure of capital investment. Q 
is Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. FF is the financial flexibility index. TAG is total assets growth and SG is sales 
growth. The detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. Panel C presents the results for the 
pooled sample. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity.  *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
Variables 
 
 (1) 
FF1 
(2) 
FF2 
(3) 
FF3 
(4) 
FF4 
Panel A: TAG as the measure of growth opportunities 
Q  3.653*** 2.579*** 1.211*** 0.075*** 
  (0.206) (0.102) (0.097) (0.020) 
TAG  0.067*** 0.060*** 0.044*** -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
CF  0.047*** 0.042*** 0.080*** 0.003*** 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  37,222 136,549 57,807 8,329 
R-squared  0.323 0.273 0.304 0.371 
Panel B: SG as the measure of growth opportunities 
Q  3.980*** 3.402*** 1.797*** 0.071*** 
  (0.204) (0.115) (0.107) (0.026) 
SG  0.044*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.050** 
  (0.262) (0.162) (0.211) (0.024) 
CF  0.082*** 0.050*** 0.087*** 0.003*** 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  36,705 135,120 57,029 8,297 
R-squared  0.279 0.175 0.232 0.375 
Panel C: Pooled sample 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
Q 4.157*** 4.853*** 
 (0.140) (0.142) 
TAG 0.074***  
 (0.002)  
SG  0.053*** 
  (0.002) 
CF 0.053*** 0.066*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
FF -2.319*** -2.227*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
Q  FF -1.528*** -1.567*** 
 (0.076) (0.075) 
TAG  FF -0.015***  
 (0.002)  
SG  FF  -0.007*** 
  (0.001) 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 239,907 237,151 
R-Squared 0.305 0.230 
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Table 5 
Country-by-country regressions. This table presents the coefficients of the interaction term between Tobin’s Q and 
the measure of financial flexibility (FF) obtained from the following investment regression for each country in our 
sample: 
,)( 111 ititititititoit udFFcCFFFQbbQaCAPX    
where CAPX is capital investment. Q is Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. FF is the financial flexibility index. The detailed 
definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by 
country and robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 5 – Continued 
 
Country Coefficients on Q  FF Standard errors 
Argentina -0.704 (0.924) 
Australia -3.696*** (0.623) 
Austria -2.357 (2.189) 
Belgium -2.306** (0.958) 
Brazil 0.263 (1.002) 
Canada -3.386*** (0.473) 
Chile -1.907 (1.290) 
Colombia -1.976 (2.024) 
Denmark -0.761 (0.582) 
Egypt -0.042 (3.345) 
Finland -0.627 (0.810) 
France -0.863** (0.398) 
Germany -1.199*** (0.395) 
Greece -0.978 (0.856) 
Hong Kong -0.625 (0.390) 
India -0.020 (0.514) 
Indonesia 0.178 (0.831) 
Ireland -0.360 (0.897) 
Israel -0.597 (0.453) 
Italy -1.442** (0.730) 
Japan -0.649*** (0.163) 
Korea -0.854* (0.503) 
Malaysia -1.096*** (0.378) 
Mexico 0.659 (0.759) 
The Netherlands -0.997* (0.513) 
New Zealand -0.656 (0.837) 
Norway -0.955 (1.144) 
Pakistan -0.912 (2.686) 
Peru 0.663 (0.918) 
Philippines -0.197 (0.869) 
Portugal 0.033 (1.513) 
Singapore -0.202 (0.650) 
South Africa -1.614* (0.845) 
Spain -0.308 (0.794) 
Sri Lanka -1.740 (2.827) 
Sweden -1.169*** (0.429) 
Switzerland -0.470 (0.488) 
Taiwan -1.457*** (0.367) 
Thailand -0.738 (0.656) 
Turkey 2.224 (1.449) 
United Kingdom -1.485*** (0.281) 
United States -1.331*** (0.125) 
Venezuela 0.060 (1.769) 
Zimbabwe 5.146* (2.964) 
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Table 6 
Robustness tests. This table presents the coefficients from the investment regression for the pooled sample based on different model specifications, estimation 
methods, and sub-samples. The dependent variable is CAPX, which is a measure of capital investment. Q is Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. FF is the financial 
flexibility index. TAG is total assets growth. RET is the annual stock return during year t-1. KZ is the adjusted Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index. The detailed 
definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. LCAPX is the lagged one-period CAPX. Qt is the contemporaneous Q. ΔCAPX is the change in CAPX 
between year t and year t-1. Column (1) reports the result from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression procedure. Column (2) reports the result based on the 
weighted least squares (WLS), where the weight is the inverse of the number of firms in each country in each month. Column (3) reports the result of excluding 
firms from Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. Column (4) reports the result of including manufacturing firms only. Column (5) reports the result of including TAG as a 
control for investment opportunities. Column (6) reports the result of replacing CAPX with ΔCAPX. Column (7) reports the result of replacing Q with RET. 
Column (8) reports the result of replacing FF with the KZ index. Column (9) reports the result of including the interaction term, FFCF, as an additional control. 
Column (10) reports the result of including two additional controls, LCAPX and Qt. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by country and robust 
to heteroskedasticity.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 41 
Table 6 – Continued 
 
Variables 
(1) 
FM 
 
 
(2) 
WLS 
 
 
(3) 
Exclude 
Japan/UK/US 
 
(4) 
Manufacturing 
firms 
 
(5) 
TAG 
 
 
(6) 
ΔCAPX 
 
 
(7) 
RET 
 
 
(8) 
KZ 
 
 
(9) 
Including 
CF  FF 
 
(10) 
Including 
LCAPX 
and Qt 
Q 5.724*** 6.319*** 8.414*** 5.034*** 40.857*** 0.966***  4.994*** 6.933*** 4.396*** 
 (0.897) (0.931) (1.818) (0.296) (3.279) (0.158)  (0.503) (1.110) (0.573) 
RET       3.206***    
       (0.574)    
CF 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.060* 0.051* -0.157 0.005 0.041** 0.070*** 0.027 0.026** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.034) (0.029) (0.126) (0.007) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.013) 
Qt          -0.072 
          (0.050) 
LCAPX          0.438*** 
          (0.017) 
FF -2.421*** -2.345*** -2.408*** -1.628*** 1.433 -2.804*** -2.804***  -2.500*** -1.358*** 
 (0.037) (0.123) (0.175) (0.131) (1.149) (0.243) (0.243)  (0.222) (0.090) 
Q  FF -2.016*** -1.796*** -2.896*** -1.447*** -5.062*** -0.127** -0.648***  -2.218*** -1.251*** 
 (0.127) (0.482) (0.723) (0.138) (1.329) (0.060) (0.251)  (0.566) (0.286) 
CF  FF         0.014  
         (0.016)  
KZ        0.254***   
        (0.087)   
Q  KZ        0.597***   
        (0.075)   
Industry and year 
fixed-effects 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations (N)  239,907 115,717 121,397 239,907 235,134 239,907 229,870 239,907 239,907 
R-squared  0.233 0.175 0.147 0.120 0.007 0.161 0.158 0.192 0.382 
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Table 7 
The catering channel and corporate investment: The effect of the cross-country difference in the cost of raising external capital. Panel A of this table presents the 
coefficients from the investment regressions based on equation (6) in the main text. All firms are split into two groups (High and Low) based on the scores of 
ACCESS (Columns (1) and (2)), TURNOVER (Columns (5) and (6)), or RD (Columns (7) and (8)).  All firms are also split into the emerging market group (Column 
(3) and the developed market group (Column (4)). The dependent variable is CAPX, which is a measure of capital investment. Q is Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. 
FF is the financial flexibility index. ACCESS is a country-level measure of ease of access to external equity markets. DEV is a dummy variable that equals one for 
developed countries and zero for emerging countries. TURNOVER is the share turnover index. RD is the R&D intensity index. COUNTRY is one of the five country-
level variables above used in the pooled sample regressions. The detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. The F-test is the test of the 
difference in coefficients of Q between the two sub-samples. Panel B reports the results from pooled regressions that include an interaction term, Q  COUNTRY. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Split-sample regressions 
Variables 
(1) 
Low  
ACCESS 
(2) 
High 
ACCESS 
(3) 
Emerging 
Markets 
(4) 
Developed 
Markets 
(5) 
Low 
TURNOVER 
(6) 
High 
TURNOVER 
(7) 
Low 
RD 
(8) 
High 
RD 
Q 1.456*** 4.291*** 1.602*** 4.056*** 2.693*** 3.947***  1.843*** 3.933*** 
 (0.199) (0.108) (0.264) (0.100) (0.295) (0.099) (0.358) (0.097) 
CF 0.158*** 0.024*** 0.161*** 0.024*** 0.126*** 0.027*** 0.191*** 0.026*** 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) 
p-value 11.81 
(0.00) 
75.97 
(0.00) 
16.25 
(0.00) 
31.84 
(0.00)  
Industry and year 
Fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 71,199 168,708 45,614 194,293 45,614 194,293 43,622 196,285 
R-squared 0.173 0.141 0.159 0.158 0.159 0.158 0.155 0.154 
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Table 7 – Continued 
 
Panel B: Pooled-sample regressions 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
ACCESS 
(2) 
DEV 
(3) 
TURNOVER 
(4) 
RD 
Q 2.534*** 3.339*** 3.528*** 3.569*** 
 (0.108) (0.142) (0.171) (0.177) 
CF 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
COUNTRY -0.601*** -1.616*** -0.394* -0. 930*** 
 (0.233) (0.232) (0.222) (0.219) 
Q  COUNTRY 1.687*** 0.611*** 0.362** 0.308* 
 (0.123) (0.150) (0.178) (0.183) 
Industry and year  
Fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 239,907 239,907 239,907 239,907 
R-squared 0.116 0.120 0.116 0.116 
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Table 8 
The joint effects of the equity-financing channel and the catering channel on corporate investment. Panel A of this table presents the coefficients of Q from the 
investment regressions based on equation (7) in the main text. All firms are split into two groups (High and Low) based on the scores of ACCESS (Columns (1) 
and (2)), TURNOVER (Columns (5) and (6)), or RD (Columns (7) and (8)).  All firms are also split into the emerging market group (Column (3) and the 
developed market group (Column (4)). The dependent variable is CAPX, which is a measure of capital investment. Q is Tobin’s Q. FF is the financial flexibility 
index. ACCESS is a country-level measure of ease of access to external equity markets. DEV is a dummy variable that equals one for developed countries and 
zero for emerging countries. TURNOVER is the share turnover index. RD is the R&D intensity index. COUNTRY is one of the five country-level variables above 
used in the pooled sample regressions. The detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. The F-test is the test of the difference in 
coefficients of Q  FF between the two sub-samples. Panel B reports the results from pooled regressions that include two additional interaction terms, Q  
COUNTRY and Q  FF  COUNTRY. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Split-sample regressions 
Variables 
(1) 
Low  
ACCESS 
(2) 
High 
ACCESS 
(3) 
Emerging 
Markets 
(4) 
Developed 
Markets 
(5) 
Low 
TURNOVER 
(6) 
High 
TURNOVER 
(7) 
Low 
RD 
(8) 
High 
RD 
Q 3.486*** 7.167*** 3.892*** 7.159*** 4.878*** 7.089*** 4.083*** 7.025*** 
 (0.305) (0.175) (0.379) (0.168) (0.419) (0.166) (0.495) (0.163) 
CF 0.174*** 0.026*** 0.181*** 0.027*** 0.141*** 0.031*** 0.210*** 0.029*** 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) 
FF -1.888*** -2.712*** -2.286*** -2.429*** -2.228*** -2.418*** -2.316*** -2.424*** 
 (0.055) (0.050) (0.079) (0.042) (0.091) (0.041) (0.099) (0.040) 
Q  FF -1.329*** -2.070*** -1.533*** -2.242*** -1.534*** -2.236*** -1.532*** -2.215*** 
 (0.141) (0.095) (0.196) (0.087) (0.226) (0.085) (0.265) (0.084) 
p-value 19.22 
(0.00) 
10.93 
(0.00) 
6.06 
(0.01) 
9.22 
(0.00)  
Industry and year 
Fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 71,199 168,708 45,614 194,293 35,809 204,098 33,569 206,338 
R-squared 0.205 0.197 0.189 0.213 0.173 0.206 0.196 0.207 
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Table 8 – Continued 
 
Panel B: Pooled-sample regressions 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
ACCESS 
(2) 
DEV 
(3) 
TURNOVER 
(4) 
RD 
Q 3.850*** 5.087*** 5.128*** 5.030*** 
 (0.213) (0.260) (0.306) (0.317) 
CF 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
COUNTRY -0.826*** -1.752*** -0.568* -1.138*** 
 (0.377) (0.401) (0.325) (0.064) 
FF -2.351*** -2.348*** -2.352*** -2.313*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Q  COUNTRY 3.622*** 2.100*** 1.991*** 1.859*** 
 (0.245) (0.285) (0.328) (0.335) 
Q  FF -0.725*** -1.038*** -1.007*** -0.961*** 
 (0.114) (0.156) (0.185) (0.201) 
Q  FF  COUNTRY -1.693*** -1.319*** -1.306*** -1.232*** 
 (0.132) (0.168) (0.195) (0.210) 
Industry and year  
Fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 239,907 239,907 239,907 239,907 
R-squared 0.163 0.168 0.164 0.166 
 
